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OIL, GAS, AND MINERALS
by
Eric T. Laity*

HIS Article surveys the significant developments of the past year in

Tthe

Texas law of oil, gas, and minerals. The scope of this Article is
limited to decisions by Texas and federal courts, to enactments of the
Texas Legislature, and to the rules and regulations promulgated by Texas
administrative agencies.'
I.
A.

JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS

Surface Deposits of Minerals

In Friedman v. Texaco, Inc.2 the Supreme Court of Texas reaffirmed that
4
3
the rules in Moser v. United States Steel Corp. apply prospectively only.
Thus, in determining whether the surface estate owner or the mineral estate
owner holds title to an unnamed mineral substance, Texas courts will apply
the surface destruction test as refined in Reed v. Wylie5 in any case in which
the mineral and surface estates were severed prior to June 8, 1983.6 The
Moser test 7 applies to severances that occurred after that date.8
The Friedman family leased their minerals to an oil company in 1939, and
* A.B., I.D., Harvard University. Attorney at Law, Kilgore & Kilgore, Inc., Dallas,
Texas.
1. The law of oil, gas, and minerals has focused historically on the exploration for and
production of minerals and hydrocarbons. Pursuant to this tradition, the law of oil, gas, and
minerals has not included the legal aspects of the transportation, refining, and marketing of
minerals and hydrocarbons. Neither have the organization and financing of the enterprises
conducting these activities been considered within the ambit of oil, gas, and mineral law. This
Article preserves the traditional focus on exploration and production.
2. 691 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. 1985).
3. 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984).
4. 691 S.W.2d at 587.
5. 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980). Under the Reed test an unnamed mineral substance near
the surface is part of the surface estate if any reasonable method of removal would consume,
deplete, or destroy the surface. Id. at 747.
6. Friedman, 691 S.W.2d at 589. June 8, 1983, was the date of the Texas Supreme
Court's first opinion in Moser. This opinion was subsequently withdrawn. Upon issuing the
second Moser opinion, the court announced that the rules of the second opinion would apply
prospectively from the date of the first opinion. Moser v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d at 103.
7. According to the test announced in Moser, a severance of minerals clause includes the
severance of any substance within the ordinary and natural definition of the word "minerals,"
regardless of the depth at which the substance is found and regardless of whether the presence
or value of the minerals is known at the time of severance. See 676 S.W.2d at 102.
8. Friedman, 691 S.W.2d at 587, 589. If a given mineral estate and surface estate, severed prior to June 8, 1983, are merged and subsequently severed after June 8, 1983, the rules
announced in Moser apply. Id. at 589.
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some twenty years later sold the surface estate while reserving the minerals.
The holder of the surface estate gave a mining lease to Texaco after the
Texas Supreme Court's decision in Acker v. Guinn,9 in which the court had
announced the first version of the surface destruction test for determining
the ownership of near-surface minerals. 10 This mining lease expressly included uranium. Based upon the specific facts of this case, the Texas
Supreme Court ruled that the new owner of the Friedman tract's surface
estate was the owner of the uranium under the tract, subject to his mining
lease with Texaco. I" In so ruling, the court stated that the surface destruction test as elaborated in Acker and in Reed applies to severances of mineral
estates occurring prior to those decisions.12
B.

Mineral Deeds

In Blanton v. Bruce' 3 the Eastland court of appeals held that the rule of
after-aquired title applies to any deed that purports to convey a definite interest in property, regardless of whether the deed's grantor expressly warrants title in the grantee.14 The Blantons' predecessor-in-title had conveyed
by deed to the Bruces' predecessor-in-title a quarter section in Eastland
County, Texas, reserving an undivided one-half of all oil, gas, and other minerals underlying the tract. Previous to this grant, the Blantons' predecessorin-title had conveyed an undivided one-quarter of the oil, gas, and minerals
under the tract to a third person. The deed to the Bruces' predecessor-intitle contained no express warranty. The Blantons argued before the court
of appeals that the rule of after-acquired title, as stated in Duhig v. PeavyMoore Lumber Co., 1 5 did not apply to their situation because the deed given
to the Bruces' predecessor-in-title did not contain a general warranty. 16
Citing the case of Lindsay v. Freeman,' 7 the court of appeals held that the
Duhig rule applied to any deed that purported to convey a definite interest in
property, regardless of whether the grantor specially or generally warranted
title in the grantee or whether the grantor warranted title in the grantee at
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
Id. at 352.
Friedman, 691 S.W.2d at 589.
Id.
688 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
See id.at 913-14.
135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940). The Duhig court stated the rule as follows:
"[A] deed purporting to convey a fee simple or a lesser definite estate in land
and containing covenants of general warranty of title or of ownership will operate to estop the grantor from asserting an after-acquired title or interest in the
land, or the estate which the deed purports to convey, as against the grantee and
those claiming under him." [American Jurisprudence] Vol. 19, p. 614, Sec. 16.
Id. at 507, 144 S.W.2d at 880 (quoted language presently appearing at 23 AM. JUR. 2d Deeds
§ 348 (1983)).
16. 688 S.W.2d at 911.
17. 83 Tex. 259, 264-65, 18 S.W. 727, 730 (1892) (covenants of warranty held not necessary for patronage of after-acquired title by estoppel if the conveyance purports to convey a
definite estate).
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all.' 8 The court expressly followed the suggestions of leading writers in the
field of oil and gas law in broadly applying the Duhig rule.' 9 The court of
appeals therefore upheld the trial court's judgment that the Bruces' predecessor-in-interest had received an undivided one-half interest in all of the oil,
gas, and minerals underlying the quarter section in question, and that the
Blantons' predecessor-in-title owned only a one-quarter mineral interest in
20
the tract.
C. Oil and Gas Leases
In Clark v. Perez21 the San Antonio court of appeals found that an amendment to an oil and gas lease did not properly amend the habendum clause
and thus failed to prevent the lease from expiring. 22 The Perez family had
given leases at different times on two adjacent tracts in Starr County, Texas.
Several years after these leases were signed the Perezes entered into an agreement with their lessee that merged the two leases together and amended
various provisions of the original leases. Each lease had called for a primary
term of five years. The amending agreement deleted the delay rental payments provision, and replaced it with the following:
This lease shall not terminate at the end of the primary term or thereafter if Lessee (a) pays Minimum Annual Advance Royalty for the ensuing year; (b) is conducting Operations; or (c) does both ....

This lease

may not be maintained for a period longer than ten (10) years from the
date hereof unless at 23
or prior to such time Mining Operations are or
have been conducted.
The lessee conducted mining operations within the meaning of the amending
agreement after that agreement entered into force.
Despite the lease amendment's specific reference to the primary term and
its contemplation of a lease term longer than the original primary term even
in the absence of production, the court of appeals held that since there was
no production from the combined tract at the end of the five-year primary
term stipulated in the later of the two original leases, the merged lease had
expired prior to the bringing of suit.24 The court recited two reasons for the
amendment's failure to prolong the lease. First, the court pointed out that
the lease amendment did not delete the habendum clause of the original
leases. 2 5 Second, the court relied on the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Southland Royalty Co.,26 which held that a lease's fixed
18. 688 S.W.2d at 913-14. The court's discussion indicates that its holding would not
extend to quitclaim deeds. See id. at 911.
19. The court cited R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 3.2, at 118 (2d ed.
1983); 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 311. 1, at 584 (1984); Hemingway,
After-Acquired Title in Texas-Part11, 20 Sw. L.J. 310, 322 (1966).
20. 688 S.W.2d at 914.
21. 679 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
22. Id. at 714.
23. Id. at 712.
24. Id. at 714.

25. Id.
26. 496 S.W.2d 547, 552 (Tex. 1973).
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term cannot be changed with words found elsewhere in the lease that are not
specifically directed to the term of the lease. 27 The court of appeals believed
that the amendment in the Clark lease failed specifically to change the term
of the lease, and therefore, held that the lease expired at the end of its pri28
mary term.
D. Pooling of Oil and Gas Leases
In Ladd Petroleum Corp. v. Eagle Oil & Gas Co. 29 the Fort Worth court of
appeals held that production from a tract that no longer is subject to an oil
and gas lease will hold in force a lease on an adjacent tract if the two tracts
previously have been pooled.30 Ladd Petroleum had been the lessee of both
the Blair and Woody leases, which covered adjacent tracts in Parker County,
Texas. The two leaseholds had been pooled prior to their acquisition by
Ladd, and one well on the Woody tract accounted for all production within
the unit. In 1976 Ladd filed a release of the Woody lease. A little more than
one year later Ladd realized its mistake and secured a new lease from the
Woody mineral interest owners. Two years later Ladd completed a producing well on the Blair tract, and several of the Blair mineral interest owners
brought suit. The Blair mineral interest owners claimed that the release by
Ladd of the original Woody lease had dissolved the pooled unit and that
without production either from the Blair tract or any land pooled with the
Blair tract the Blair lease had terminated pursuant to its habendum clause.
The court of appeals held that even though the Woody lease had terminated, the Woody tract itself remained pooled with the Blair lease. 3' The
court of appeals noted that the pooling provision of the Blair lease permitted
pooling with "other lands, lease or leases."132 In the court's view, the lessee
was not restricted to pooling the Blair lease with an existing lease, and the
continuing validity of the pooling unit did not depend upon the existence of
a lease covering the adjacent tract. 33 The court's opinion did not specify the
exact interests that constituted the pooling unit. The pooling agreement
34
stated that it covered "the lease acreage hereinafter expressly designated."1
The agreement apparently described as designated lease acreage only the two
tracts of land, although it might also have included descriptions of the leases.
In drawing its conclusion, the court of appeals distinguished 35 the case of
Texaco, Inc. v. Lettermann.16 In Texaco two of the three leases subject to a
pooling declaration had terminated for lack of production according to the
terms of their habendum clauses. Under a complicated set of facts, the Tex27. 679 S.W.2d at 714.
28. Id.
29. 695 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 105-06.
Id. at 106.
Id.
Id. at 105-06.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 106.
343 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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aco court held that a pooled unit terminates when only a single lease remains
in effect. 37 The Ladd Petroleum court distinguished Texaco on the overly
facile ground that the Texaco leases had expired for lack of production,
38
whereas the Woody lease had expired through a release.
The result in Ladd Petroleum at the court of appeals level is analogous to
the result in Duffy v. Callaway,39 a case concerned with a community lease.
In Duffy part of the acreage subject to a community lease was released by the
lessee. The Duffy court refused to hold that as a matter of law the minerals
underlying the released acreage did not remain communitized among all of
the lessors to the community lease.40 The law dealing with involuntary terminations of pooled units is unclear and the question of whether an analogy
between the Ladd Petroleum circumstances and community leases ought to
be drawn would benefit from a thorough analysis by the Texas Supreme
Court. That court, however, refused an application for writ of error in Ladd
Petroleum, finding no reversible error.
E.

Standards of Care Owed by Lessees

In Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hagen4' the Texarkana court of appeals upheld a trial court's determination that an oil and gas lessee had breached the
standard of highest good faith in performing pursuant to an implied covenant to market production, and affirmed the trial court's award of exemplary
damages against the lessee. 42 Texas Oil & Gas was the operator of three gas
wells in which the plaintiffs held royalty interests. As operator of the wells,
Texas Oil & Gas had entered into a gas purchase contract with Delhi Pipeline Company, its wholly owned subsidiary. The gas purchased by Delhi
Pipeline Company under this contract was first transported away from the
wells to plants for dehydration and the removal of various substances, and
was then transported an additional distance for delivery to several end users.
The price paid by the end users to Delhi was fifteen cents per thousand cubic
feet of gas higher than the price provided in the contract between Delhi and
Texas Oil & Gas. Under the terms of the oil and gas leases covering the gas
wells in question, the landowner royalties on gas sold at the well were to be
computed as a fraction of the sale proceeds obtained by the operator. If,
however, the gas was sold away from the well, the leases provided that royalties were to be computed as a fraction of the fair market value of the gas as it
was produced at the well. Texas Oil & Gas had been paying the plaintiffs on
the basis of the sale proceeds of the gas under its contract with Delhi rather
than on the basis of the fair market value of the gas as it was produced at the
well.
The trial court found that the gas purchase contract between Texas Oil &
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 731.
695 S.W.2d at 106.
337 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1960, no writ).
Id. at 388-89.
683 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1984, writ requested).

42. Id. at 28-29.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40

Gas and Delhi was a sham transaction, and that the sale of the gas had in
fact occurred off the premises in transactions with the end users. In finding
that the gas purchase contract was a sham transaction, the trial court had
determined that Delhi in these circumstances was merely the alter ego of
Texas Oil & Gas. In upholding the trial court's determinations, the court of
appeals noted that the two companies had the same office and field personnel, that Texas Oil & Gas directly paid all of the payroll for Delhi and directly controlled all of Delhi's business functions, and that Texas Oil & Gas
had acted as Delhi's representative for the gas sales agreements with the end
43
users in this case.
The court of appeals thus upheld the trial court's finding that Texas Oil &
Gas sold the gas from the plaintiffs' wells directly to the end users and affirmed the lower court's judgment on the basis of breach of contract. 44 The
appellate court held that Texas Oil & Gas had breached the terms of the
applicable oil and gas leases by failing to calculate correctly the royalties due
to the plaintiffs. 45 The plaintiffs' royalties should have been calculated on
the basis of the market value of the gas as produced at the well, subject to
46
the applicable price ceilings established by the Natural Gas Policy Act.
Further, the court of appeals affirmed the lower court's award of exemplary
damages against Texas Oil & Gas on the basis that an oil and gas lessee must
be held to a standard of highest good faith while fulfilling its implied covenant to market the production from leases in a manner that will secure the
highest price reasonably obtainable. 47 The court of appeals reasoned that
such a high standard of care places the lessee in a position of trust toward its
lessors and that a violation of that relationship justifies an award of exem48
plary damages.
In concluding that the lessee was obligated to act in highest good faith
toward its lessors in the matter of marketing production, the court of appeals
cited Amoco Production Co. v. FirstBaptist Church.4 9 In that case, however,
the El Paso court of appeals inferred an implied covenant in an oil and gas
lease to market natural gas at fair market value. 50 Ordinarily, a breach of an
implied covenant in an oil and gas lease is considered a breach of contract
and will not support an award of exemplary damages. 5' Furthermore, the
First Baptist Church court did not address the question of exemplary damages. The Texarkana court of appeals nevertheless affirmed the exemplary
43. Id. at 28.

44. Id.
45. Id.

46. Id. at 29; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1982). The court of appeals was unable to
ascertain whether the market value found by the district court for gas sold after passage of the
Natural Gas Policy Act exceeded the Act's maximum allowable price. The court of appeals,
therefore, remanded the cause to the district court. 683 S.W.2d at 29.
47. 683 S.W.2d at 29.
48. See id. at 29-30.
49. Id. at 29. The Amoco case appears at 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1979), writ ref'd per curiam, 611 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1980).

50. 579 S.W.2d at 285-87.
51. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 571 (Tex. 1981) (exemplary
damages held recoverable only when plaintiff pleads and proves a tort).
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damages award. 52 The court justified its decision on the basis that exemplary damages may be awarded in a breach of contract case when the breach
is accompanied by fraud, especially if the defendant's concealment requires
the plaintiffs to go to great lengths and expend substantial sums to discover
the fraud.5 3 The court stated that bad faith was synonymous with fraud,
and that the breach of a confidential relationship or the use of any device to
deceive another may in a proper case amount to fraud. 54 Whether any of
these arguments will persuade the Texas Supreme Court to uphold the
award of exemplary damages for a breach of contract remains to be seen.
In Fuqua v. Taylor5 5 the Dallas court of appeals upheld the imposition of
a constructive trust on a geologist's overriding royalty interest in favor of
owners of working interests in an overlapping but expired prospect. 56 Fuqua
was a geologist who from time to time reworked unproductive gas wells in
hope of making them productive. In such an effort, Fuqua acquired four
leases that together formed the necessary spacing unit around an unproductive gas well. To finance the necessary reworking operations, Fuqua assigned working interests in the leases to investors in exchange for funds.
With each of these investors, Fuqua signed a letter agreement that provided
that" '[i]f at a later date it is deemed advisable to drill a second well you will
be given the option to participate. . .. -57 The reworking operations were
not successful, and the leases were permitted to lapse.
Prior to the completion of reworking the first well, however, Fuqua received a commitment from another operator for the acquisition of leases surrounding a nearby well. After the leases forming the spacing unit around
the first well expired, Fuqua obtained a new lease on part of the first well's
spacing unit and assigned the new lease to the second operator, reserving an
overriding royalty for himself. At this point, the investors in the first well,
who had been working interest owners in the expired leases, brought suit to
impose a constructive trust for their benefit on Fuqua's overriding royalty
interest.
The court of appeals held that the individual letter agreements between
Fuqua and his investors established the relationship of joint venturers among
them.5 8 Citing the case of Rankin v. Naftalis,5 9 the court of appeals further
held that the joint venture relationship between Fuqua and each of his investors was fiduciary in character. 60 Fuqua had failed to inform the investors of
52. 683 S.W.2d at 29.

53. Id. at 29-30.
54. Id. at 30.
55. 683 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).

56. Id. at 738.
57. Id. at 737.
58. Id. at 738. The court of appeals does not reveal in its opinion whether the investors
had entered into a joint operating agreement with Fuqua for the reworking of the first well.
Whether an area of mutual interest agreement was in force among the investors and Fuqua

cannot, therefore, be determined.
59. 557 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1977) (fiduciary duty applying to parties to oil and gas venture

extends only so far as relationship of parties).
60. 683 S.W.2d at 738.
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the opportunity to acquire a new lease on part of the spacing unit for the first
well. The court held that this omission constituted a breach of his fiduciary
duty and, therefore, supported the imposition of a constructive trust. 6'
II.

STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS

In an overhaul of the responsibilities of state leasing boards, the Texas
Legislature abolished the Board for Lease of State Park Lands and the Board
for Lease of Eleemosynary and State Memorial Park Lands. 62 The legislature transferred the activities of these abolished boards to the School Land
Board. 63 Among the activities transferred is the supervision of the preferential right, newly created by the legislature, 64 in favor of adjacent mineral
owners to lease state-owned rights-of-way. 65 The legislature enacted additional provisions' regarding the appointment of individuals to the School
Land Board, 66 as well as additional qualifications on the method by which
the board can offer leases to the public and on the terms of those leases. 67
Despite the legislature's general consolidation of state leasing in the School
Land Board, it continued the separate leasing boards for lands owned by the
Texas Parks and Wildlife Department and the Texas Department of Corrections. 68 The legislature placed the appointment of individuals to these
boards, the manner in which leases are offered, and the terms of those leases
under strictures similar to those enacted for the School Land Board and its
69
leases.
The legislature also increased the penalties for late royalty payments to
the State of Texas, and set an annual rate of interest for delinquent royalties. 70 Certain oil and gas leases and mineral leases must now include a
provision requiring the payment of damages to the state for the use of the
surface. 7 1 The amount of these surface damages will be set by rule of the
Commissioner of the General Land Office. 72
In amendments to the Relinquishment Act 73 the legislature decreed that
the surface owner of land subject to the Act may not lease the land to himself or to a related party. 74 In addition, the surface owner owes the State of
Texas a fiduciary duty, a duty of utmost good faith, and all of the common
law duties of a holder of executive rights. 75 The attorney general may file an
61. Id.
62. Act of June 14, 1985, ch. 624, § 55, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4727, 4757 (Vernon).

63. Id.
64. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 34.0511-.0513 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
65. Act of June 14, 1985, ch. 624, § 51, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4727, 4756 (Vernon).
66. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 32.0121-.0123, .0171 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
67. Id. §§ 32.107-.1073, .151-.156.
68. Id. § 34.011.
69. Id. §§ 34.0131-.0135, .0191-.0192.
70. Id. § 52.131(c), (e)-(i).
71. Id. §§ 52.297, 53.155.
72. Id. §§ 52.297(b), 53.155(b).
73. Id. §§ 52.171-.187 (Vernon 1978 & Supp. 1986).
74. Id. § 52.187 (Vernon Supp. 1986). The surface owner, however, may become the assignee of an oil and gas lease with prior approval of the General Land Office. Id.
75. Id.
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action to enforce
these duties or to cause the forfeiture of the surface owner's
76
rights.
agency
The legislature transferred jurisdiction over brine mining from the Texas
Water Commission to the Railroad Commission of Texas. 77 The Railroad
Commission is now empowered to issue permits for injection wells used for
brine mining. 78 The legislature also gave the Railroad Commission jurisdiction over the discharge of waste or other substances from uranium exploration activities 79 and specified civil, administrative, and criminal penalties for
violations of rules, orders, and permits issued by the commission.80 The
Railroad Commission may now authorize the confiscation of productionrelated equipment at the site of an abandoned well for the purpose of com8
pensating a person who plugs the well as agent for the commission. '
The legislature enacted a requirement that electric logs now be filed with
the Texas Railroad Commission.8 2 A basic electric log made when drilling a
well must be filed at the time a person files a completion report for the well
or, in the case of a dry hole, at the time a person files an application to plug
the well.8 3 A log filed with the commission becomes public information unless the person who is required to file the log requests confidential treatment
of the log.8 4 Confidential treatment is temporary, lasting from one to seven
years depending on circumstances.8 5 During the period of confidentiality,
the log remains in the possession of the person who would otherwise be required to file it, unless the commission requires the filing of the log.8 6 The
commission may refuse to assign an allowable for a well's production if a
87
required electric log has not been filed for that well.
The legislature also passed new royalty reporting standards. Royalty interest owners are now entitled to be furnished certain production and financial information with each royalty check.8 8 No express penalties are
provided for those who fail to furnish this information.
III.

ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

During the survey period the Railroad Commission of Texas adopted
amendments to its rules dealing with the release of hydrogen sulfide gas dur76. Id.
77. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 27.036 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986).

78. Id.
79. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 131.301-.302 (Vernon Supp. 1986).

80. Id. §§ 131.303-.305.
81. Id. § 89.085.
82. Id. §§ 91.551-.556.
83. Id. § 91.552.
84. Id. § 91.553.
85. Id.
86. Id. § 91.553(b). Id. § 91.554 contemplates that the commission may require that a
confidential log be filed with the commission before the expiration of the period of
confidentiality.
87. Id. § 91.556.
88. Id. §§ 91.501-.506.
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ing drilling operations. 8 9 The amendments require operators to maintain
certain safety equipment at specified sites, to institute training programs for
employees, and to notify the commission of hazardous releases of hydrogen
sulfide gas. 90 The amendments are designed better to protect the public
from the dangers of hydrogen sulfide gas. 9 1
The Railroad Commission also replaced its rules dealing with the allocation of skim hydrocarbons to producing properties. 9 2 Skim hydrocarbons
are oil and condensate accumulations that result from salt water disposal
skimming operations. 93 The new rule allocates these liquid hydrocarbons,
for purposes of reporting production, proportionately to all producing
properties that contributed water to the salt water disposal system. 94 The
old rule allocated these skim hydrocarbons only to the producing properties
95
that were classified as oil properties.

89.
§ 3.36).
90.
91.
92.
§ 3.56).
93.
94.
95.

Tex. R.R. Comm'n., 10 Tex. Reg. 2069 (1985) (amending 16 TEX.

ADMIN. CODE

Id.
Id.
Tex. R.R. Comm'n, 10 Tex. Reg. 4279 (1985) (replacing 16 TEX.

ADMIN. CODE

Id. at 4280.
Id.
See id.

